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Taking Temporary Workers’ Rights Seriously 
Agency and Consent1 
 
ANDREI STAVILĂ 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Since temporary workers are transiently present in their host state, their 
rights are usually restricted compared to native citizens or other types of 
migrants. They may be able to apply for jobs only in some economic sectors but 
not in others, they may not be able to bring their families into the host state, or 
they may have only a strictly time-limited contract and afterwards they must 
leave the host state. Adopting a perspective situated at the intersection of 
normative political theory and international relations theory, this article 
investigates how we can normatively design the range of rights a temporary 
worker should enjoy irrespective of her host country. 
The second section asks whether temporary migrants’ rights can be 
adequately met through a progressive development in international law. It 
claims that it is generally impossible to accommodate international institutions 
with the doctrine of state sovereignty when other concerns than general basic 
human rights are taken into account. A good example is the Migrant Workers 
Convention, which has not been signed up to date by any OECD immigration 
country, and the main reason for this seems to be its incompatibility with the 
generally accepted principle of state sovereignty. The obvious objection here 
claims that in practice states did sign many international conventions that 
actually limit their sovereignty. Why should the case of Migrant Workers 
Convention be seen differently? The rejoinder explores the conditions 
emphasised by the international relations theory under which states sign 
international covenants that limit their sovereignty and show that none of these 
conditions obtains in the case of the convention under scrutiny. 
If we accept that a positive development in international law is not 
foreseeable in the near future, then how can we approach the problem of 
temporary workers’ rights nowadays? Two points of view must be taken into 
                                                 
1
  I would like to thank Rainer Bauböck, Joseph Carens, David Owen, and Anna 
Triandafyllidou for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 
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account here: that of migrants and that of host states. The third section discusses 
host states’ point of view, which is usually based on the rights versus numbers 
problem. Basically, this dilemma’s horns are whether states should accept a 
great number of migrant workers without also offering them a large number of 
rights (especially the right to access full citizenship after a number of years of 
residence), or if they should accept only a small number of migrants that must 
be put on the path to citizenship after the same residence threshold is met. This 
article claims that this dilemma cannot be solved as long host states do not also 
take into account temporary migrants’ interests. 
In consequence, the fourth part discusses immigrants’ perspective and 
asks whether their rights should depend on migrants’ own preferences for (a) a 
higher income over stronger rights or (b) their social space of reference over 
their political space of rights. The article supports the claim that democracy’s 
concerns with formal equality should be balanced against migrant workers’ 
needs – however, this balance should be accepted only as long as the trade-off is 
temporarily limited, is respecting basic human rights, and is acceptable in 
migrants’ own view. 
The fifth section tries to pinpoint to the direction we have to look 
towards in order to find an answer to the question regarding legitimate limits of 
states’ and migrants’ bargaining capacities concerning temporary workers’ 
range of rights. Accepting a distinction between “human rights” and 
“citizenship rights” we can claim that (a) human rights must be observed by 
immigration states (irrespective of local practices in undemocratic countries), 
and (b) under strict conditions, some citizenship rights may be traded off in 
order to support migrant workers’ projects. The main claim here is that 
supporting migrants’ agency and their freedom to negotiate an “equality based 
on special status”2 may become the most urgent thing to do as long as 
international conventions on this topic are not going to be observed in the 
foreseeable future. 
The final section hints at a problem in political philosophy: if temporary 
workers’ own perspective is acceptable and if we should take into account 
migrants’ agency, then this argument has broader implications that take us 
beyond migration theory: it may help reviving the consent theory as a serious 
contender in the field of political obligation. We may need a broader theory 
with several principles of political obligation in order to support different 
individuals’ duty to obey the law. If this view is correct, then we might have a 
case where consent theory may well support political obligations of three 
specific categories of individuals: temporary workers, irregular migrants and 
external quasi-citizens. In consequence, the consent theory could become a 
                                                 
2
  Valeria Ottonelli, Tiziana Torresi, “Inclusivist Egalitarian Liberalism and Temporary 
Migration: A Dilemma”, Journal of Political Philosophy, vol. 20, no. 2, 2012, pp. 202-224. 
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serious principle supporting migrants’ duties and thus could be a part of a 
general theory of political obligation. 
 
 
Can Temporary Migrants’ Rights Be Adequately Met through 
A Progressive Development in International Law? 
 
Realists in international relations theory claim that it is difficult to 
accommodate state sovereignty with international institutions and documents 
regarding specific categories of rights. Such an accommodation may be possible 
on the topic of serious criminal state practices such as genocide, but when it 
comes to lesser human rights violations sovereignty still carries the day and 
makes international conventions irrelevant. Take the example of the 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families3, which was adopted by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations on 18 December 1990. Motivated by the 
increasing phenomenon of labour migration and by the weaker status (as 
compared with native workers) enjoyed by permanent resident workers, 
temporary workers and irregular migrants in the host societies all over the 
world, the Convention promised to become a major human rights instrument. 
The Migrant Workers Convention entered into force on 1 July 2003, but by 2015 it 
had not been signed or ratified by any OECD major immigration country.4 
The justification of this failure is related to the principle of national 
sovereignty. As one author remarks5, although the MWC tried to accommodate 
competing concerns regarding both sovereignty and human rights, the former 
seems to have won the debates surrounding the drafting of this document. 
Firstly, states may ratify it with reservations. Secondly, the “Convention permits 
state parties to pursue the immigration control policies that they see fit”6. If this 
is the case, then why has no major OECD immigrant country signed the MWC? 
The answer lies in the fact that fears regarding loss of sovereignty still carry the 
                                                 
3
  Henceforth Migrant Workers Convention, MWC, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/ 
bodies/cmw/cmw.htm (last accessed 12 May 2015). 
4
  Only three OECD countries signed the convention by 2015: Chile, Mexico and Turkey (it 
is important to note that the last two states may arguably be considered today ‘major 
immigration countries’). Source: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails. 
aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-13&chapter=4&lang=en (last accessed 31 August 
2015). 
5
  Linda Bosniak, “Human Rights, State Sovereignty and the Protection of Undocumented 
Migrants Under the International Migrant Workers’ Convention”, in Barbara Bogusz, 
Ryszard Cholewinski, Adam Cygan, Erika Szyszczak (eds.), Irregular Migration and 
Human Rights: Theoretical, European and International Perspectives, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 2004, pp. 311-341. 
6
  Ibidem, p. 316. 
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day. The extensive human rights protections afforded by the document are seen 
to infringe both states’ right to control immigration and their alleged right to 
treat citizens and resident aliens differently. 
The obvious objection to this view is that states have often signed 
conventions that largely limit their sovereignty, even in the field of 
immigration. A good example is the 1951 Refugee Convention, under which 
every country must respect the non-refoulement principle, which denies states 
the right to expel aliens in countries where their lives or basic rights might be 
threatened. So in fact states do sign treaties which limit their sovereignty. Why 
the case of the MWC is so different? 
In international relations theory there are different explanations for the 
reasons states sign international human rights laws. Goldsmith and Posner offer 
three possible motives7. The first is coincidence of interests: governments are 
rarely interested in committing crimes against humanity8. The second is 
cooperation: there are multilateral agreements regarding reciprocal treatment of 
ethnic minorities. The third is coercion: signing under the threat of force. The 
problem is that multilateral human rights treaties are not based on cooperation, 
be it symmetric (e.g., the protection of Protestant and Catholic minorities in the 
post-Westphalian world) or asymmetric (e.g., the UK’s “carrot and stick” 
strategy for ending the slave trade in the 19th century). Since there is no 
“effective coercive enforcement mechanism”, the benefits of signing (economic 
benefits included) can be rather substantive. In consequence, on the one hand, 
non-liberal non-democratic states can sign them without any problem, since 
they incur no or little cost by violating those norms. On the other hand, liberal 
democratic states can easily sign the treaties because they already comply with 
their terms; and where they do not comply, RUDs (reservations, understandings, 
declarations) are easily available tools. The same conclusion is supported by 
other researchers in international relations theory. Krasner explores Western 
states’ compliance with treaties concerning respect for minority rights in Europe 
in the last 500 years, and his conclusion is that rights are respected only as long 
as great powers have (a) an interest in, and (b) enough capabilities for upholding 
and enforcing them on non-observant states9.  
Finally, there is another possibility to change states’ behaviour towards 
human rights, both domestically and at the international level. On the one hand, 
according to constructivist approaches in international relations, when people 
adopt new understandings and ideas about individual rights (and in the process 
                                                 
7
  Jack Goldsmith, Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2005. 
8
  On the other hand, it is true that governments may have an interest in keeping control over 
judgments about what constitutes a crime against humanity. 
9
  Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty. Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, New Jersey, 1999. 
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challenge “traditional definitions and allocations of entitlements”), the political 
system can either try to accommodate the new rights claims or, if it fails to do 
this, it can collapse under such struggles. A good example is the disintegration 
of imperial systems, which came about when subject peoples, unsatisfied with 
the metropole’s way of addressing its crisis of legitimacy, turned from “voice” 
to “exit”10. On the other hand, some liberal theorists underline that the position 
of states concerning human rights can be changed through negotiations at the 
international level. For example, references to human rights in the Charter of the 
United Nations were not intended by the great powers. On the contrary, this 
came about as a consequence of the diplomatic efforts of smaller, non-Western 
states’ (former colonies, Latin-American and Asian countries, etc.)11, and as a 
consequence of the influence of some providential personalities12. 
Without the intention of exhausting the entire possible range of causes, 
we can thus conclude that generally a great power signs a human rights treaty if 
at least one of the following conditions obtains: (a) its domestic practices are 
already similar to the norms promoted by the international document; (b) it is in 
the state’s interest to take this course of action13; (c) it is the best thing the state 
can do given the moral and material context within international relations at a 
specific moment; and (d) changes in people’s paradigms of moral thinking 
occur, public opinion is gradually convinced by the new perspective, and the 
struggles for individual rights become powerful enough to change states’ 
behaviour. Conversely, smaller and/or non-liberal democratic states sign 
international human rights treaties because: (a) they are not affected by them14, 
and even if they are affected, there is no cost of violating signed treatises, or the 
cost is extremely small; (b) the benefits of signing them can be substantive; (c) 
there is some threat of force from great powers. 
Now let us apply this to the case of temporary workers, in order to find 
the answer to the question raised above: why has no major immigration country 
signed the MWC? Underdeveloped and non-democratic states have signed it 
either because they are not immigrant-receiving countries or simply because the 
document does not infringe their sovereignty: violating the treaty bears no costs 
                                                 
10
  Christian Reus-Smit, “Struggles for Individual Rights and the Expansion of the 
International System”, International Organization, vol. 65, no. 2, 2011, pp. 207-242. 
11
  Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights: A History, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 
London, 2008. 
12
  Ann M. Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, Random House Trade Paperbacks, New York, 2002. 
13
  A broader definition of “interest”, which includes the interest to be seen as creating 
“codes of conduct” and promoting “standards of civilization” needs to be drawn on here 
(Jack Goldsmith, Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International…cit.). 
14
  Priit Järve, Vadim Poleshchuk, “Country Report: Estonia”, EUDO Observatory on 
Citizenship, RSCAS/EUDO-CIT-CR 1-16, 2010, available at: http://eudo-
citizenship.eu/admin/?p=file&appl=countryProfiles&f=Estonia.pdf. 
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since there is no control mechanism. Moreover, their image on the international 
arena is improved by signing yet another human rights instrument. 
But democratic immigration states didn’t sign it for five principal 
reasons. Firstly, they do not already comply with most of the terms set by the 
MWC. In spite of publicly condemning infamous temporary worker programs 
like the Gastarbeiter15 program in Europe or the Bracero16 program in the 
United States, and in spite of a general acceptance that past policies regarding 
migrant workers’ rights cannot be accepted anymore, host democratic states are 
not ready to receive large numbers of people who can easily qualify, sooner or 
later, for almost all citizenship rights. The second motive is closely connected 
with host countries’ interests. According to Ruhs17 and Castles18 many Western 
states contemplated before the 2008 global economic crisis the possibility of 
reintroducing migrant worker programs. In times of crisis the attractiveness of 
such programs may be indeed lower, but even in such situation high-income 
states still need temporary workers since 4D (dirty, dangerous, demeaning, and 
demanding) jobs are still refused by natives. As long as there is a strong demand 
for them, temporary migrant workers may continue to come even if 
governmental-sanctioned temporary worker programs are terminated for 
political and economic reasons. Since these countries’ governments are very 
much aware of the slogan “there is nothing more permanent than temporary 
foreign workers”19, signing a convention that severely restricts their policies 
regarding the treatment of non-citizen residents is something that states are not 
ready to engage in20. The third reason is that there is an increase rather than a 
decrease in demand at the international level not only for foreign workers 
(within immigration states) but also for more temporary worker programs 
(within emigration states). The fourth reason is that in spite of many NGOs 
activities, there are no conditions yet for a major shift in our moral thinking, and 
the struggles for migrant workers’ rights are not powerful enough in order to be 
                                                 
15
  For a general discussion of the Gastarbeiter program see Ray C. Rist, Guestworkers in 
Germany. The Prospects for Pluralism, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1978, and Rita 
Chin, The Guest Worker Question in Postwar Germany, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2007. 
16
  For a general discussion of the Bracero program see Edwin P. Reubens, “Temporary 
Foreign Workers in the U.S.: Myths, Facts and Policies”, International Migration Review, 
vol. 20, no. 4, 1986, pp. 1037-1047. 
17
  Martin Ruhs, “The Potential of Temporary Migration Programmes in Future International 
Migration Policy”, a paper prepared for the Policy Analysis and Research Programme of 
the Global Commission on International Migration, 2005, available at: 
http://economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk/12666/1/TP3.pdf. 
18
  Stephen Castles, “Back to the Future? Can Europe meet its Labour Needs through 
Temporary Migration?”, International Migration Institute, Working Paper No. 1, 2006, 
available at http://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/pdfs/imi-working-papers/wp1-backtothefuture.pdf/view. 
19
  Martin Ruhs, “The Potential of Temporary Migration Programmes… cit.”. 
20
  Stephen Castles, “Back to the Future? Can Europe meet… cit.”. 
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able to change immigrant states’ behaviour. And fifthly, there is no pressure 
(regarding migrant workers’ rights) at the international level similar to that raised 
immediately after the Second World War regarding general human rights, which 
resulted in the proclamation of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
In conclusion, migrant workers’ rights are probably not going to be 
enhanced at the international level in the foreseeable future because of the 
impossibility of accommodating in this specific case state sovereignty and 
international institutions. Even if most countries accepted some limits on their 
sovereignty, as the general observance of the non-refoulement principle shows, 
there are specific reasons for which further limits on sovereignty are not likely 
to be welcomed. It is true that today “it is no longer acceptable for a government 
to make sovereignty claims in defence of egregious [my emphasis] rights 
abuses”21. But short of being “egregious”, any rights abuse which is not gross 
enough can be defended by making such claims. The fact that the Migrant 
Worker Convention has not been signed yet by any major OECD immigration 
country fits well in this logic. 
 
 
The “Rights versus Numbers” Dilemma 
 
If in the international legal system it is difficult to predict a change in 
migrant workers’ rights in the foreseeable future, we should turn our attention to 
the main actors’ perspectives. The present section discusses the host states’ 
viewpoint, while the next one takes into account temporary workers’ specific 
point of view. From the immigration countries’ perspective there are moral 
dilemmas that can appear irrespective of the social and temporal context. 
Generally, all these dilemmas are more or less instances of one major 
conundrum: when a receiving polity’s interests and migrants’ interests clash, 
which one should take precedence? Is it morally acceptable to restrict individual 
persons’ opportunities because of a liberal democracy’s legitimate concern with 
formal equality?  
An instance of this major conundrum, called the rights versus numbers 
dilemma, is based on the claim that integration of immigrants involves 
economic, social and cultural costs. If these costs are too high, immigration can 
put pressure on the welfare state, on states’ capacity to maintain public order, 
and it may in principle lead to rapid cultural disruption22. This claim has been 
                                                 
21
  Beth A. Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights. International Law in Domestic Politics, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009, p. 3. 
22
  Veit M. Bader, “The Ethics of Immigration”, Constellations, vol. 12, no. 3, 2005, pp. 331-
361; Sarah Fine, “Freedom of Association is not the Answer”, Ethics, vol. 120, no. 2, 
2010, pp. 338-356; Sarah Fine, Immigration and the Right to Exclude, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2013. 
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evidently challenged from many points of view. For example, Jordan and 
Düvell argue that from the economy’s perspective in the case of migration, 
benefits outweigh costs both in the case of host and in that of origin countries. 
According to them, if we presuppose that the migrant herself fulfils her goals, 
then immigration can be a win-win-win situation23. However, it is not easy to 
measure, let alone compare, the real economic costs of world migration. 
Remittances can be an engine for development, but they can also cause inflation 
and can increase the developmental gap between sending and receiving 
countries24. Even if remittances have no negative effect, it is still difficult to 
weight them against the negative effects of brain drain. It is not my intention 
here to make a definitive argument that migration has costs, hence immigration 
controls are acceptable, and the dilemma between rights and numbers is valid. I 
rather want to argue that the costs are reasonable enough in order to make this 
dilemma a real subject of concern. 
If the argument that unrestricted immigration can jeopardise states’ 
capacity to maintain viable social institutions and programs, public order, and 
protection against rapid cultural change is correct, then some immigration 
restrictions based on consequentialist arguments (taking into account 
immigration’s effects on the host states) are justified25. For example, restrictions 
can refer to already over-populated areas, and temporary migrants can receive 
work permits only for those economic sectors where demand for labour exists – 
and not for those characterised by high rates of unemployment. Restrictions can 
be made on other reasonable grounds like housing or general welfare state 
capacities. One standard counter-argument here is that temporary workers and 
immigrants in general do not put pressure on the welfare system since they (just 
like native workers) pay all their taxes. However, we also have to take into 
consideration migrant workers’ dependants – their spouses, and children. If the 
spouse cannot be employed, or simply cannot find work, she needs social 
services. Furthermore, children must go to school. If immigration is 
unrestricted, then it is reasonable that situations like these will put pressure on 
the welfare system. This is especially the case when migrant workers earn less 
than natives – or less than the alleged native worker would have earned, had she 
accepted the job. 
                                                 
23
  Bill Jordan, Franck Düvell, Irregular Migration: The Dilemmas of Transnational 
Mobility, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, MA, 2002. 
24
  Mark J. Miller, “Introduction [Special Issue: Temporary Worker Programs: Mechanisms, 
Conditions, Consequences]”, International Migration Review, vol. 20, no. 4, 1986, pp. 740-757. For 
the counter-argument which emphasizes that there is no evidence that remittances have 
created inflationary pressure in the development of Asian countries see Charles W. Stahl, 
Fred Arnold, “Overseas Workers’ Remittances in Asian Development”, International 
Migration Review, vol. 20, no. 4, 1986, pp. 899-925. 
25
  This evidently implies that other immigration restrictions based on non-consequentialist 
grounds like ethnic homogeneity are unacceptable. 
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Another standard counter-argument is that in order to solve this welfare 
state problem the government should guarantee equal pay for equal work to 
both native and migrant workers. The argument can also be made for equal 
working conditions, equal social housing, etc.26. It has of course not been used 
in order to restrict immigration, but to support equal rights for native and 
migrant workers. But the claim misses the point, since making migrants’ wages 
identical to those of native workers would not solve the problem. Firstly, such a 
policy would undermine the very reasons for implementing a temporary foreign 
worker program: had the employers been obliged to hire migrant workers on 
contractual terms identical to those they must offer to natives, they wouldn’t 
have demanded migrant workers in the first place. Some may be content with 
this proposal, which would terminate the need for such programs, but the 
scholars who support labour migration as a way of alleviating at least a small 
part of global poverty might disagree. Secondly, the presupposition according to 
which “there are no jobs for which [native] workers cannot be found if the pay 
is high enough”27 is at best unfounded. Even if salaries are significantly – but 
also reasonably28 – increased for 4D jobs, it is doubtful that native workers 
would necessarily agree to do them. This is because, from the conceptual point of 
view, dirty, dangerous, demeaning and demanding jobs are not necessarily identical 
with low-paid jobs. Even increasing significantly wages for current 4D jobs, 
they will still remain at least dirty, dangerous and demanding (if not also 
demeaning), since augmented economic value does not necessarily mean added social 
and cultural value, and many native workers may still refuse to accept them. 
It is thus obvious that if states want to accept migrant workers, they 
must be ready not only to enjoy the benefits, but also to pay the costs. And these 
costs may be quite high for a host country committed to liberal-democratic 
values. If such a state accepts migrants, it must be able to set them on the path 
to full citizenship status after the qualification condition concerning the number 
of residence years spent in the host state is satisfied. However, non-liberal 
democracies do not have such a problem. As we will see in the next section, 
when a state is not committed to the idea of equality of individuals as human 
beings – and maybe not even to the idea of equality of citizens – then it can 
accept large numbers of migrant workers. The latter will not put pressure on 
states’ capabilities as long as their rights are severely restricted. For example, 
                                                 
26
  Joseph Carens, “Live-in Domestics, Seasonal Workers, and Others Hard to Locate on the 
Map of Democracy”, The Journal of Political Philosophy, vol. 16, no. 4, 2008, pp. 419-
445; Robert Mayer, “Guestworkers and Exploitation”, The Review of Politics, vol. 67, no. 
2, 2005, pp. 311-334. 
27
  Ibidem, p. 432. 
28
  This is an important caveat. It may be the case that even a celebrated university professor 
would quit her job and prefer to wash dishes in a restaurant for three million US dollars 
per month, but the example is too far-fetched. 
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they may not have the right to bring their families to the receiving country, they 
may have restricted access to social services, etc. But this amounts to creating a 
“caste-like” system. Indeed, permanent partial citizenship without the 
possibility of acquiring full citizenship rights amounts to establishing such a 
scheme29. We could confidently say about temporary workers in these polities 
that “[while] they are guests, they are also subjects. They are ruled, like the 
Athenian metics, by a band of citizen-tyrants”30. 
As a consequence, it seems that the choice a polity faces is between 
restricting numbers in order to offer more rights (an option usually selected by 
Western countries) and, as we will see in the next section, restricting rights in 
order to admit more temporary workers (preferred by immigrant-receiving 
polities like Hong Kong and Singapore). The crucial point is that it is not 
obvious that the moral, liberal-democratic solution is either better or more 
desirable than the non-liberal, undemocratic one. Firstly, to use Bell’s realist 
assessment, the Asian example demonstrates that migrant workers leave poor 
but fairly democratic states in order to work in wealthier, undemocratic 
countries – and it seems they fare better in the latter. A lack of democracy 
seems beneficial for foreign domestic workers also for another reason: had 
natives, especially employers, the chance to vote for their representatives, they 
would have favoured policies more disadvantageous for temporary workers’ 
interests. Conversely, as long as politicians are not compelled by a democratic 
decision-making process to satisfy the general public’s preferences, foreign 
domestic workers enjoy some level of protection, low as it may be31. 
Secondly, what seems the right thing to do prima facie, at a closer look 
may not necessarily represent the right action required by justice. Chang 
formulates the same dilemma between rights and numbers as “the immigration 
paradox”: liberal democratic states take for granted the moral principle that, 
once accepted, guest workers must be given equal rights. But the impossibility 
of offering equal rights to large numbers is the reason that guest workers are not 
accepted in the first place. In other words, concern for the well-being of 
temporary migrants makes liberal democracies accept fewer migrants, thus 
rendering their situation worse than it would have been, had host states accepted 
them and offered them fewer rights. But ‘this moral stance is unsatisfactory 
from the standpoint of human welfare. The liberal who prevents a poor alien 
                                                 
29
  Linda Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien: Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 2006. 
30
  Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality, Basic Books, 
New York, 1983, p. 58. 
31
  Daniel A. Bell, “Justice for Migrant Workers? Foreign Domestic Workers in Hong Kong 
and Singapore”, in S.-H. TAN (ed.), Challenging Citizenship: Group Membership and 
Cultural Identity in a Global Age, Ashgate, Aldershot, Hants, England & Burlington, VT, 
2005, pp. 41-62. 
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from escaping poverty while citing principles of justice and equality for that 
alien seems vulnerable to the charge of “superstitious ‘rule worship”’32. 
If this is the case, then the choice is between two evils, guest-worker 
programs being one evil and exclusion the other. Both Bell and Chang consider 
that accepting more temporary migrant workers while restricting their rights is 
clearly a better alternative than largely closing borders to immigrant labour. 
This alternative is “better” because immigration states may have to somehow 
solve a dilemma between their commitment to equality and the moral duty to 
alleviate the world’s poverty. Since according to the quoted authors the last 
quest is more important, the problem of rights versus numbers should be solved 
by immigration states in favour of numbers, and temporary migrants’ rights 
may thus be restricted. However, none of these scholars offers guidelines 
regarding the extent of such restrictions. 
 
 
Should Migrant Workers’ Rights Depend on their Own Preferences? 
 
If we take temporary migrants’ preferences into account, the solution 
may be to design different systems of rights that depend on migrants’ own 
predilection for (a) higher income over stronger rights or on (b) their social 
space of reference over their political space of rights. This section intends to 
investigate both proposals. 
According to the first suggestion, there is no moral problem in having 
different practices regarding temporary migrants’ access to rights in different 
parts of the world. Bell argues that Canada may legitimately accept few 
temporary workers while setting them on the path to full citizenship, and Hong 
Kong may also legitimately admit large numbers of temporary workers while 
denying them many social, economic and political rights33. Bell makes his 
argument in four steps. Firstly, he takes into account the personal concerns of 
temporary workers and reveals that in some Asian countries they do not see the 
problem of equal rights as their most pressing issue. Quite the contrary, they are 
usually worried about other, more pressing subjects: they fight against the idea 
of limiting their work to eight hours a day, against cutting wages in time of 
crisis, and against the “two-week rule”, according to which if they lose their job 
they must go home as long as they don’t find employment in two weeks. 
Secondly, in some parts of the Asian continent lack of democracy benefits 
temporary workers: some of them leave democratic countries in order to work 
in autocratic but wealthier states; in some minimal democratic countries 
temporary workers fare worse than in dictatorial regimes; and, finally, lack of 
                                                 
32
  Howard F. Chang, “The Immigration Paradox: Alien Workers and Distributive Justice”, 
in Roger M. Smith (ed.), Citizenship, Borders and Human Needs, University of 
Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2011, p. 97. 
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democracy may be beneficial for temporary workers since in some states if 
employers would have the chance to vote for their decision makers, they would 
prefer policies that go against migrant workers interests, and politicians would 
also favour their constituency and not migrant workers’ concerns.  
Thirdly, Bell accepts that ideally migrant workers should be given equal 
rights, but still claims that some counter-arguments have their own merit. 
Migrants consented to come to the host state (and such a consent cannot be 
compared with selling oneself into slavery); in some undemocratic states 
citizens would not agree with extending migrant workers’ rights as long as their 
own rights are restricted; sometimes, as we have already seen, it is not clear that 
the rights versus numbers dilemma should be solved in favour of rights; and 
global poverty reduction may be better served through migrant workers 
programs than through idealistic arguments like increasing foreign aid. 
Fourthly, cultural characteristics must also be taken into account. Unlike 
citizens in the western states, Asians consider domestic workers as “extended 
family members”. This is the explanation of a lack of demand for day-care 
centres in Asia: given “the choice between at-home care for children and day-
care, most people seem to prefer the former”34. 
A second proposal of taking migrants’ interests into account is 
connected to their social spaces of reference, and is usually referred to as the 
“bases of self-respect” puzzle. As we have already seen, migrants are ready to 
trade off some of their rights for material gains, thereby making vulnerable not 
only their own position within the host country, but also their prospects 
regarding savings, possibility of return, family reunification, etc. The interesting 
question here is why they are so ready to undertake this bargain. Additionally, 
we may ask what the normative grounds which make such a trade possible are. 
An interesting argument claims that temporary migrants’ self-assumed 
vulnerability undermines liberal egalitarian ideals35. The problem is complicated 
by the fact that the standard solution (i.e., offering them more rights) fails. 
Interestingly enough, this shows that even if the dilemma discussed above 
between rights and numbers can be solved, this does not necessarily imply a 
solution to the problem of migrant workers’ vulnerability. And the standard 
solution fails because even if these individuals formally enjoy equal rights, they 
would still be ready to trade them off (as shown by the case of EU citizens from 
new member states who trade off their rights under pressure to secure 
employment in the ‘old’ member states’ segmented labour markets). This is 
because liberal democracies presuppose an identity between the political space 
of rights and the social space of self-respect: for their citizens, equal political 
rights represent the sine qua non condition for their “right to pursue their own 
happiness and life plans”36. However, this is not the case of temporary migrants. 
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  Ibidem, p. 57. 
35
  Valeria Ottonelli, Tiziana Torresi, “Inclusivist Egalitarian Liberalism and Temporary 
Migration: A Dilemma”, Journal of Political Philosophy, vol. 20, no. 2, 2012, pp. 202-224. 
36
  Ibidem. 
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In their situation, there is no match between the social and political spaces. 
Their bases of self-respect are situated in the origin country: their migration 
project is intended to improve their life plans at home. However, the political 
space of equal rights is situated in the host state. Since these two spaces are 
disconnected, the trade-off becomes possible. Migrants are simply ready to 
trade temporarily some (arguably, many) of their rights in order to improve their 
future condition at home. 
This creates a problem for any liberal democracy dedicated to the 
principle of individuals’ equal standing. The choice is between letting 
temporary workers pursue their plans and thereby abdicating the principle of 
equal standing, on the one hand, and upholding this principle which means to 
disregard migrants’ life plans, on the other37. We face again the conflict 
between the public interest and migrant workers’ interests. Like Bell and 
Chang, Ottonelli and Torresi support a solution which gives more weight to 
temporary workers’ concerns. In this case, “the more ambitious goals of social 
equality” should be given up in order to make room for a more complex notion 
of “equality based on special status” which is supposed to be more sympathetic 
to migrant workers’ plans. 
But neither of these authors further develop their normative solution for 
this unresolved dilemma in the standard liberal approach: which rights can be 
traded off, and for how long such a bargain is acceptable? What rights could be 
lowered for the sake of better immigration opportunities and higher remittances 
for country of origin populations? No author seems able to provide the necessary 
tools to impose limits on what can be traded off by foreign temporary workers when 
their interests collide with those of a liberal democratic host country. 
 
 
What Can Be Negotiated and What Cannot Be Traded Off? 
 
A useful distinction can be made between citizen rights (based on state 
sovereignty and on the view of the individual as a member) and human rights 
(based on transnational society and on the view of the individual as a person)38. 
Against Bell’s proposal one could argue that human rights should be imposed 
on states irrespective of local practices. The prohibition of genocide may be a 
good example that such top-down impositions are feasible at the international 
level in spite of the sovereignty doctrine. 
However, one could also reasonably argue that it is permissible for 
states to tolerate temporary workers as “partial citizens” and to allow them a 
“margin of trading off” their rights as residents, as long as their consent is 
acknowledged, the possibility to leave is not only formal but also substantive, 
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  Ibidem. 
38
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and their human rights (and possibly other crucial social and economic rights) 
are safeguarded. Bargaining some social or political rights (if we look at the 
problem from a migrant workers’ perspective) or denying such rights to a class 
of residents (taking the host country’s point of view) is permissible only as long 
as human rights are not affected by the trade-off and as long as this bargain or 
denial is temporary. The immigration state is thus responsible to either limit 
temporary workers’ contracts to less than the specific residence condition for 
citizenship acquisition in the host state (for example, three or five years), or to 
put them on the path to full citizenship status once the requirement of three or 
five years of residence is fulfilled. 
The temporary character of this transaction is important not only for 
immigrants themselves, who otherwise would be transformed in a class of 
“metics” ruled by a “band of citizen-tyrants”39, but also for the immigrant-
receiving polity, for two main reasons. Firstly, by accepting only short-term 
departures from its liberal-democratic values based on foreign workers’ special 
status and taking seriously into consideration their own projects, such a polity 
can consistently uphold its values and, at the same time, recognise that it may 
temporarily bypass them when other more important moral values are at stake. 
Secondly, even such a temporary bypassing can be tolerated only as long as the 
number of partial citizens is low: if sidestepping political rights were permanent 
and the numbers of long-term partial citizens large, a liberal democracy 
accepting this situation would face dramatic decline. Indeed, as Bauböck argues 
using his “hypermigration” model, in a world in which “in most countries a 
majority of citizens would be non-residents and a majority of residents would 
be non-citizens […] the impact on democracy would be quite dramatic”40. 
However, the most difficult questions here are: what are the limits to 
individuals’ free choice? How much can they bargain? Which rights can be 
traded off for material benefits even for a short period of time? Who decides 
what these “marketable” social and economic rights are and on what basis one 
decides that? For example, one may argue that an international convention or 
maybe even each state may decide minimum standards that must be 
acknowledged besides human rights, and may set a limited package of rights 
that can be negotiated by employers and employees. There is no space to outline 
here such a project; however, ever since John Locke41, Immanuel Kant42 and 
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  Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice…cit. 
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John Stuart Mill43, it is obvious that freedom of will cannot justify unlimited 
power to negotiate a contract. Selling oneself into slavery cannot be a morally 
valid action even if one freely consents to it.  
This view is also embedded in international human rights instruments. 
For example, art. 3(a) of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children lists slavery as one 
category within the broader term of “exploitation”, while the latter notion is 
defined as the purpose of trafficking. Further, art. 3(b) clearly states that the 
consent of a victim is irrelevant even if (as stated in the preceding paragraph) 
the consent was achieved as a consequence of receiving of payments or 
benefits44. However, it is extremely difficult to define what slavery is: when can 
a practice be considered as slavery? In a paper exploring the anti-slavery 
project, Quirk notes that 
 
“[…] it can often be difficult to say whether the term is being invoked literally or 
rhetorically. Behind this conceptual ambiguity is an underlying model, which maintains 
that particular practices can be equated with slavery when they cross a certain threshold 
and are sufficiently horrendous and/or analogous to be classified as such. This model is 
at the heart of contemporary slavery, but it is not always clear where this threshold 
applies, or whether it should apply in one case but not another […]”45.  
 
Thus it is difficult to say where the threshold lies between trafficking 
and forced labour, on the one hand, and smuggling and indentured migration, on 
the other. While the former always imply overt coercion and can be easily 
termed as slavery, the latter examples may or may not imply such practices. 
The threshold problem brings us back to migrants’ agency and interests. 
Because Bell, Chang, Ottonelli and Torresi support locally-negotiated practices 
regarding migrant workers’ rights, their perspectives  avoid the line of criticism 
according to which foreign workers are presented with an already-designed 
contract offered on a ‘take it or leave it’ condition46. In practice, this happens in 
many Western immigrant-receiving countries but not, as Bell emphasised, in 
some Asian polities like Hong Kong where many associations for the protection 
of foreign workers’ rights are constantly negotiating wages and immigration 
laws such as the two-week rule. I am suggesting neither that the organisational 
support for migrant workers is stronger in Asian polities like Hong Kong than in 
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Western states, nor that the presence of NGOs renders legitimate the polices 
against which they are protesting. But I want to suggest that in some Asian 
states, migrants’ agency may be (for better or for worse) exhibited in ways it is 
not in the Western states, and incidentally this does not go against migrants’ 
own plans. The attractiveness of such a perspective is given by its capacity to 
account for both migrants’ and governments’ agency, thus not only resurrecting 
the consent theory in political philosophy, as we will see in the next section, but 
also (and more importantly) turning attention from liberal democracies’ own 
concerns regarding equal rights to temporary foreign workers’ interests. 
 
 
Temporary Workers and the Consent Theory of Political Obligation 
 
The argument regarding migrants’ bargaining capacity has an 
implication not entirely made obvious by its proponents: by turning our 
attention from the public interest of host countries to temporary migrants’ 
projects, we cannot avoid the latter’s agency. Usually concerned with liberal 
and democratic values in Western liberal democracies, political theorists tend to 
forget, or at least to minimise, the choices individuals make within a polity. 
This attitude is not necessarily odd, since apart from Locke few major liberal 
theorists really took seriously the consent theory of political obligation. The 
main questions here are what exactly grounds a moral duty to obey the laws of 
one’s state and how a person acquires such an obligation. According to the 
consent theory (and contrary to other contemporary theories of political 
obligation based on other singular principles like gratitude, fair play, 
association, or natural duty), citizens must obey a polity’s laws because they 
accepted to live on that polity’s territory. However, since no citizen ever 
“actually” (i.e., conscientiously and formally) consents to her state’s laws, today 
political theorists generally agree that consent can be neither a principle for 
individuals justifying their duty to obey political authority’s laws47, nor a principle for 
political associations justifying their character as voluntary associations48. 
However, new developments in immigration theory and citizenship 
studies may offer new grounds for reviving the consent theory. The increase in 
the number and the speed of means of transportation, low fares, greater 
accessibility, the development of tourism and structural needs of various labour 
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  A. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, Princeton University 
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Obligation”, Political Studies, vol. 39, no. 4, 1991, pp. 676-690. 
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markets and economic systems have allowed people to move faster and more 
often. According to some estimates, in 2008 there were over 200 million inter-
state migrants worldwide; that is, over 3 percent of the world’s population49. In 
some Western European countries the share of immigrants is between five and 
ten percent of the total number of citizens, and in Germany more than fifteen 
million people have an “immigration background”. 
What these developments show is that people are increasingly choosing 
their country of residence and they are doing this intentionally, knowingly, 
more or less voluntarily, and in spite of all the difficulties generally associated 
with the act of emigrating or of those linked with the reality of competing 
loyalties. All individuals who emigrate and apply for another country’s 
citizenship can thus be seen as consenting to the authority of the political power 
of the host society. If this view is correct, then two consequences need to be 
taken into account. 
Firstly, the consent theory of political obligation must be revisited. It 
cannot justify the obligation of all citizens of a state (especially of those who 
did not openly consent) to comply with that state’s laws. However, it is not 
clear why a single principle should account for political obligations of all types 
of members: the compliance with a state’s laws may be justified by different 
principles for different categories of citizens. If this is true, consent theory can 
account for political obligations of at least three large groups of individuals: 
irregular immigrants, temporary workers and dual citizens50. 
Some people disagree on this point. Carens believes that this is not self-
evident and offers the usual example used against the consent theory: “If a 
robber says ‘your money or your life’ and you give him your money, have you 
consented?”51. Carens is thus worried about the underlying legitimacy of the 
political and social orders within which individuals have to make choices. 
However, unlike native citizens, a migrant’s situation is not best explained by 
the robbery example. Any migrant makes plans before leaving her origin state, 
and she also reflects on which country she would like to move to. Unlike a 
native-born citizen, the migrant has a list of options regarding accessible host 
countries, and this makes her choice valid. It may not be a perfectly 
unconstrained choice, but it is still an authentic one. And what Carens calls the 
“underlying legitimacy of the political and social orders within which 
individuals have to make choices” is a problem for the home country (the 
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country where the migrant usually makes her choice), not for the host country 
where the migrant wants to arrive. 
Secondly, consent is not only a principle justifying some categories of 
citizens’ duties to obey the law; it also becomes a principle of inclusion into the 
demos. As one author puts it trying to make a stand against the idea of 
automatic/mandatory acquisition of citizenship52, “naturalization can be either 
discretionary or an entitlement, but it always depends on the active consent [my 
emphasis] of the person to be admitted”53. For both temporary and permanent 
migrants the contract theory and the consent it presupposes (the consent of both 
the migrant and the host state) can be seen as principles of membership. For 
example, a sociologist observes that “every foreigner that is admitted to reside 
in France for the first time or that has entered France regularly between the age 
of 16 and 18 needs to sign a ʻreception and integration contract’. This contract 
makes provisions for civic training and, if necessary, language education”54. 
Sociologists as well as economists have supported the link between 
migration and consent, even as political theorists have rejected it. Criticizing the 
neoclassical approach, which tries to explain labour migration using “push” and 
“pull” factors, or “in terms of wage-rate-differentials and unemployment-rate-
differentials”55, one author proposes a demand-determined approach which 
takes demand for foreign labour in the host country as the sufficient condition, 
and the “migration-willing workers” as the necessary condition for labour 
migration56. Taking a “migrant’s projects” point of view, like Ottonelli and 
Torresi, and connecting it with the rational choice theory, Straubhaar enlists 
some elements which are involved in an individual’s decision to migrate to 
work in another country: the costs related to migration abroad; profession-
specific factors (sometimes subjective evaluation of the job can override higher 
salaries); expectations regarding return and employment in the origin country; 
availability or lack of information regarding conditions in the host country; the 
personal degree of risk-aversion; the evaluated risk of remaining unemployed in 
the receiving state; and so on57. Migrants’ agency in explaining the causes of 
labour migration is crucial: it elucidates why labour migration does not occur at 
a much higher scale, as the neoclassical approach emphasizing only push and 
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pull factors or differences in wages and unemployment rates between wealthy 
and poor countries would seem to imply. 
What is important to stress is the fact that Straubhaar lays emphasis not 
only on migrant workers’ consent, but also on the receiving polity’s will. The 
author explicitly says that “if no government wants to admit foreign workers, no 
international labor migration will occur”58. The host country’s consent plays an 
important role for other scholars too. Although he accepts the “free choice of 
the migrant”, Penninx quotes Bohning59 and considers that 
 
“we do not start from the assumption that the ʻfree choice of the migrant’ explains all 
migration phenomenon: in the context of international (labor) migration the ʻfree 
choice’ of the migrant is largely determined by and dependent on regulations set by the 
receiving industrial nations, which draw a borderline around themselves over which 
non-belongers may not step without explicit or tacit consent”60. 
 
All of the above seem to imply that both host polity’s consent and 
temporary foreign workers’ free choice play a crucial role in explaining both 
international labour migration and migrants’ inclusion in the receiving society. 
If this is correct, then further normative work is needed in order to fully develop 
a new role for consent theory in the field of political obligation. This section 
only tried to illustrate the main directions of such a development and how could 
one get together migration theory and political obligation. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The importance of these considerations on migrants’ agency is crucial 
especially in our time. Rist wrote in his book on Guestworkers in Germany: “To 
build and firmly establish the legitimacy of a multicultural society stands as 
perhaps the preeminent challenge to Germany today”61. On October 2010, 32 
years later, German Chancellor Angela Merkel declared that “attempts to build 
a multicultural society in Germany have ʻutterly failed’”62, and that “immigrants 
needed to do more to integrate – including learning German”. Other European 
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leaders followed suit. In Munich on 5 February 2011, British Prime Minister 
David Cameron declared that in the UK “state multiculturalism has failed”63; 
five days later French President Nicolas Sarkozy said that multiculturalism was 
a “failure”, warning that such a concept fostered extremism64. 
Rists’s call for multicultural policies was meant to come as an 
appropriate answer to the fact that Germany became a multicultural polity as a 
result of its “guest worker program”. In his view, since so-called temporary 
workers had already permanently settled and were economically perfectly 
integrated, denying social and cultural integration would be an unacceptable 
policy. A few years later, exploring the case of Sweden as a happy exception 
from the European Gastarbeiter program, Hammar went even further and 
warned that “[i]f many foreign workers are excluded from political participation 
over a long period of time, the legitimacy of the political system is 
endangered”65. 
In the context in which all high-income countries openly or tacitly 
accept migrant labour and if after the economic crisis which began in 2008 
some of these countries will consider to reintroduce state-sanctioned temporary 
foreign worker programs, the above declarations of the German Chancellor, 
French President and British Prime Minister are not only detrimental to 
multicultural policies per se. By moving from one extreme (accepting 
permanent second-class citizenship of migrant workers in the 1970s and 
beyond) to the other one (forced assimilation and integration) they are also 
detrimental to every future migrant because they destroy the most important 
insight revealed by authors like Bell, Chang, Ottonelli and Torresi; namely, 
temporary migrants’ agency, and their freedom to negotiate an equality based 
on special status. 
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